In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit production, inventory-holding and backlogging cost. Cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities: agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost, among those in the coalition. For this class of games, we give an explicit form for its characteristic function based on some monotonicity rules. This form exhibits the zero-inventory order (ZIO) property satisfied by these productioninventory problems. In addition, we prove that the resulting cooperative game is totally balanced, and the set of Owen-allocations reduces to a singleton. Based on this type of allocations we find a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for this class of games. Finally, we investigate the relationships of the Owen allocation with other well-known allocation schemes as the nucleolus and the Shapley value.
Production-Inventory games: a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games
Introduction
One of the main objectives of management of firms is cost reduction. In order to get this objective, group of firms tend to form joint ventures to diminish operation costs making dynamic decisions throughout a finite planning horizon. In tactical planning of enterprises which produce indivisible goods, operation costs mainly consists of production, inventory-holding, and backlogging costs. These joint ventures should induce individual and collective cost reductions; thus, stability in the process of enterprises cooperation is achieved. In our framework, joint ventures means that the group of firms would have access to the set of technologies of the other members in the consortium. This implies that the members are allowed to choose the other's technologies to improve their operations costs. In economical words, we allow members to operate by taking the best technology (the one with minimum cost) of the firms in the group. Planning is considered throughout a finite time horizon, therefore at the beginning of each period (when decisions are made) groups are allowed to change their costs which depends on the best technology at that point.
The model that represents that situation is the dynamic, discrete, finite planning horizon production-inventory problem with backlogging. The objective for any group of firms is to satisfy the demand of indivisible goods in each period at a minimum cost. This is a well-known combinatorial optimization problem for which the algorithm by Wagner & Whitin provides optimal solutions by dynamic programming techniques. The optimal solutions of this problem lead to the best production-inventory policy for the group of firms. These policies generate an optimal operation cost for the entire group. The question is which portion of this cost is to be supported by each firm. Cooperative game theory provides the natural tools for answering this question.
The analysis of inventory situations is not new. Thus, one can find in the literature centralization inventory models approached from this point of view. Eppen (1979) , Hartman et al. (2000) , Slikker et al. (2001) , and Muller et al. (2002) have treated cooperation in a news-vendor problem. A similar consideration for the continuous review inventory model is studied in Gerchak and Gupta (1991) , Robinson (1993) , and Hartman and Dror (1996) . Tijs et al. (2000) study a situation where one agent has available an amount of storage space and the other agents have some goods, part of which can be stored generating benefits. A general framework for the study of continuous time decentralized distribution systems is analyzed in Anupindi (2001) . The problem of sharing the benefits produced by full cooperation between agents is tackled by introducing a related cooperative game. Minner (2003) analyzes horizontal cooperations between organizations that have the opportunity to jointly replenish material requirements. In Meca et al. (2003) , (2004) and Meca (2004) a group of firms dealing with the ordering and holding of a certain commodity (every individual agent's problem being an EPQ and EOQ problem, respectively), either decide to cooperate and make their orders jointly or consider coordination with regard to ordering and holding costs. The interested reader is referred to Borm et al. (2001) for a detailed presentation of inventory games.
On the other hand, nowadays it is a hot topic the study of cooperative combinatorial optimization games which are defined through characteristic functions given as optimal values of combinatorial optimization problems (see for instance Shapley and Shubik, 1972 , Dubey and Shapley, 1984 , Granot, 1986 , Tamir, 1992 , Deng et al. 1999 , and Faigle and Kern, 2000 . There are characterizations of the totally balancedness of several classes of these games. Inventory games and combinatorial optimization games are up to date disjoint classes of games. While in the former class there is always an explicit form for the characteristic function of each game, the characteristic function of the games in the latter class is defined implicitly as the optimal value of an optimization problem in integer variables.
In this paper we introduce the class of production-inventory games which combine the characteristics of inventory and combinatorial optimization games: they model cooperation on production and storage of indivisible goods and their characteristic function is defined implicitly as the optimal value of a combinatorial optimization problem. It turns out to be a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games.
We start by introducing definitions and notations in section 2. In section 3 we give a complete description of the production-inventory problem (PIP). A natural variant of this problem in which several agents facing each one a (PIP) decide to cooperate to reduce costs: a production-inventory situation (PIS), is addressed in section 4. Then, for each (PIS), the corresponding cooperative game structure, namely production-inventory game (PIG), is defined. The main results (totally balanceness and an explicit form for the characteristic function) are stated in this section. Section 5 completes the study of (PIG) by showing that the Owen set of a (PIS) shrinks to a singleton: the Owen point. Its explicit form is also provided, and moreover, it is proved that the Owen point can be reached through a pmas. In addition, a necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a (PIG) to be a singleton: the Owen point, is presented. We propose the Owen point as a core-allocation for a (PIG) which is easy to calculate and satisifies good properties. Finally, several examples which answer natural questions arising when a new class of totally balanced games and a new value for it is proposed, are given.
Preliminaries
Production-inventory games constitutes a class of cooperative cost games with transferable utility (TU games). A TU cost game is a pair (N, c), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the finite player set and c : P(N ) → R the characteristic function satisfying c(∅) = 0. The subgame related to coalition S, c S , is the restriction of the mapping c to the subcoalitions of S. We denote by small letter s the cardinal of set S , i.e. card(S) = s, for all S ⊆ N. A cost-sharing vector will be x ∈ R n and, for every coalition S ⊆ N we shall write x(S) := i∈S x i the cost-sharing to coalition S (where x(∅) = 0). For each cost-sharing vector x ∈ R n , we define the vector of excesses of the coalition as Θ(x) := (x(S) − c(S)) S⊆N . The core of the game (N, c) consists of those cost-sharing vectors which allocate the cost of the grand coalition in such a way that every other coalition pays at most its cost by the characteristic function: Core(N, c) = {x ∈ R n /x(N ) = c(N ) and x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊂ N } . In the following, costsharing vectors belonging to the core will be called core-allocations. A cost game (N, c) has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced (see Bondareva 1963 or Shapley 1967 . It is a totally balanced game if the core of every subgame is nonempty. Totally balanced games were introduced by Shapley and Shubik in the study of markets games (see Shapley and Shubik, 1967) .
A population monotonic allocation scheme (see Sprumont, 1990 A game is said to be subadditive when for all disjoint coalitions S and T, c(S ∪ T ) ≤ c(S) + c(T ) holds. In a subadditive game, it will always be beneficial for two disjoint coalitions to cooperate and form a larger coalition. Balanced cost games might not be subadditive but they always satisfy subadditive inequalities involving the grand coalition. However, totally balanced cost games are subadditive. A well-known class of balanced and subadditive games is the class of concave games (see Shapley, 1971 ).
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 ) is a linear operator on the class of all TU games and for a cost game (N, c) is defined as Φ(N, c) = (Φ i (N, c) ) i∈N where for all i ∈ N
The Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 ) is the allocation that lexicographically minimizes the excess vector. It is well-known that it is a core-allocation provided that the core is nonempty.
Finally to simplify the presentation, for a generic problem (P) we will denote in the following by val(P ), F (P ) and O(P ), the optimal value, the set of feasible solutions and the set of optimal solutions of problem (P), respectively.
Production-Inventory problems
To start with, the basic form of the production-inventory model is now described (the interested reader is referred to Tersine, 1994 for further details). Demand for a single product occurs during each of T consecutive time periods that are numbered 1 through T . The demand that occurs during a given period can be satisfied by production during that period, during any earlier period (as inventory is carried forward) or can be backlogged to be covered by production at future epochs (as backlogged demand is accumulated). Inventory at epoch 1 is zero, and inventory at the end of period T is required to be zero. The model includes production, inventory and backlogging costs. The objective is to schedule production so as to satisfy demand at minimum cost. Formally, a production-inventory situation is a 5-tuple (T, d, h, b, p) where:
• T is the planning horizon.
•
• h = (h 1 , . . . , h T ), h t = unit inventory carrying costs in period t, t = 1, . . . , T .
The decision variables of the model are:
• q t = production during period t.
• I t = inventory at hand at the end of period t.
• E t = backlogged demand at the end of period t.
These decision variables are required to be in integer quantities. The resolution amounts to solve the following mathematical programming formulation:
Constraint (1) ensures initial and final conditions on inventory and backlogged demand. Matter is conserved, and (2) requires that the sum of the inventory at the end of a period is the sum of the inventory at the end of previous period minus consumption. Finally, constraint (3) ensures non-negativity and integrity of the variables in the problem.
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We associate with problem (P B) its linear relaxation (LP B). This problem turns out to be:
Our first result is a technical lemma that relates problems (P B) and (LP B).
Lemma 3.1 If vector d has integer components all the extreme points of the feasible region of (LP B) are integer.
Proof. The constraint matrix of problem (LP B) is:
Since A is a 0, ±1 valued matrix, where each column has at most one +1 and at most one −1 then A is totally unimodular (see e.g. Theorem 6.27 in Cook et al., 1998). Therefore the polyhedron defined by A with right-hand-side vector d is integral. Let (DLP B) be the dual of (LP B). This problem is given as
The consequence of Lemma 3.1 is that:
val(P B) = val(LP B) = val(DLP B).
Moreover, the problems (P B) and (LP B) have integer optimal solutions. Let
According with this notation one can check that a feasible solution for (DLP B) is given as:
where
The reader may notice that this solution induces a feasible solution in the primal problem. In this solution the demand d t that occurs in period t is produced according with the following scheme:
Lemma 3.2 The vector y
* given in (13) is an optimal solution of problem (DP LB).
Proof. Check feasibility by replacing the values in the constraints of problem (DLP B). This solution induces a feasible production plan (q
both solutions are optimal in their corresponding problems. The reader may notice that assuming that all the units costs h, b and p are non negative integer the solution y * would be also integer. Moreover, we would like to have more information about the structure of the optimal solution set to (DP LB)? Next theorem shows that the optimal solution y * given by (13) is the maximum of all optimal solutions. Hence, it is called maximal optimal solution for (DP LB).
The following technical lemma will be useful to prove the theorem. In fact, it reveals that vector y * is the componentwise maximum of all feasible solutions. Recall that by F (DP LB) we denote the feasible solution set for (DP LB).
Suppose there exists a period t ∈ {1, . . . , T } such that y t > y * t . Three situations can be considered:
Then, y * t = p t , and so y t > p t which is a contradiction since y ∈ F (DP LB).
We can conclude y t ≤ y * t , ∀t ∈ {1, ..., T }. 
Theorem 3.4 The optimal solution set of problem (DP LB) is given by
O(DP LB) = y ∈ F (DP LB) y t ≤ y * t if d t = 0 y t = y * t if d t > 0 .
Proof. Take y ∈ O(DP LB

Production-Inventory games
Once we have revisited the classical version of the production-inventory problem (PIP), we address a natural variant of this problem in which several agents facing each one a (PIP) decide to cooperate to reduce costs. Here the cooperation is driven by sharing technologies in production, inventory carrying and backlogged demand. Thus, if a group of agents agree on cooperation then at each period they will produce and pay inventory carrying and backlogged demand at the cheapest costs among the members of the coalition. Formally, a productioninventory situation (PIS) is a 5-tuple (N, D, H, B, P ) where N is the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and for each player
is a (PIP). The reader may notice that
and 
Every cost TU-game defined in this way is what we call a productioninventory game (PIG).
The main result in this section states that every (PIG) is totally balanced, hence subadditive.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N, D, H, B, P ) be a (PIS) with D being an integer matrix. The corresponding (PIG) (N, c) is totally balanced.
Proof. For any S ⊆ N consider the reduced game (S, c S ). Let y * be an optimal solution of (DLP B(S)). Define u
* = (y * d i ) i∈S ∈ R |S| . It is clear that: i∈S u * i = T t=1 y * t d S t =
val(DLP B(S)) = val(LP B(S)) = c S (S).
Moreover, for any R ⊆ S, y * is a feasible solution for (DLP B(R)) since the constraint matrix does not depend on S and the right-hand-side of (DLP B(S)) is componentwise smaller than or equal to the one of (DLP B(R)). Hence,
Therefore, Core(S, c S ) = ∅.
We note in passing that although (PIG) are totally balanced games, in general these games are not concave (see example 4.4).
Recently, Deng et al. (1999) and (2000) have studied some families of combinatorial optimization games, namely packing and covering games, for which they prove total balancedness. Here, we have presented a different class exhibiting the same property. The core of the above mentioned classes of combinatorial optimization games coincides with the set of dual solutions, i.e. optimal solutions of the dual problem to the one that defines the characteristic function. However, the same property does not hold in our class (PIG) as will be shown in the next examples. In order to study the core set within the class (PIG) we introduce the so called Owen set: the set of allocations that are achievable through dual solutions (see Gellekom et al., 2000) . Formally, the Owen set of (N, D, H 
, B, P ) is defined by
Owen(N, D, H, B, P ) = {(y
As a straightforward consequence of Theorem 4.1, we obtain that
Owen(N, D, H, B, P ) ⊆ Core(N, c).
Our next example shows that in general there are core allocations not achieved with dual solutions. The unique optimal solution of (DLP B({1, 2})) is (y * 
Example 4.2 Consider the following (PIS) with two periods and two players
d S 1 d S 2 p S 1 p S 2 h S 1 h S 2 b S 1 b S 2 c)
In order to get the Owen set one has to solve three optimization problems, (DLP B({1, 2})), (DLP B({1})) and (DLP B({2})).
In general, for a n-player game 2 n − 1 optimization problems would have had to be solved. For the sake of simplicity, we obtain an explicit form for the characteristic function of (PIG).
Consider (DLP B(S)) the dual of (LP B(S)), (DLP B(S)) max
11 and denote
Similar arguments to the ones given in section 3 show that for all S ⊆ N, S = ∅, the optimal solution set of problem (DP LB(S)) is
O(DP LB(S)) = y(S) ∈ F (DP LB(S))
where y * (S), the maximal optimal solution, is now given by
with
and
The reader may notice that {H 1 (S), H 2 (S), H 3 (S)} is a partition of the planning horizon set {1, . . . , T } . According to this notation, it can be checked that an explicit form for the characteristic function of (PIG) is given by (22) .
Proposition 4.3 Let (N, D, H, B, P ) be a (PIS) with D being an integer matrix, and (N, c) the corresponding (PIG). Then, for each
S ⊆ N, S = ∅ c(S) = t∈H1(S) p S t d S t + t∈H2(S) d S t p S k h + h S k h t + t∈H3(S) d S t p S k b + b S tk b . (22)
Proof. Taking into account that for any S ⊆ N, c(S) = val(DLP B(S)) and y * (S) ∈ O(DP LB(S)), we obtain c(S)
Hence, (22) holds. The explicit form above turns out to be expectable. It means that if we are in a period in which production costs are less than production-inventory carrying and production-backlogging carrying costs (t ∈ H 1 (S)), we should produce all the demand in that period. On the contrary, if the period is such that production and production-backlogging carrying costs are greater than productioninventory carrying ones (t ∈ H 2 (S)), all the demand should have been produced in the period just before with minimum cost (k h ) and inventory carried until that period (t). Finally, in a period where production and production-inventory carrying costs are greater than production-backlogging carrying ones (t ∈ H 3 (S)), all the demand should be produced in the period just after with minimum cost (k b ) and backlogging carried until that period (t).
The reader may notice that if the matrices H, B and P are in integer values then the characteristic function of these games is also integer.
Next example illustrates all the results obtained in Section 4. 
It can be easily checked that for all S ⊆ N, H 1 (S) = {2}, H 2 (S) = {3}, H 3 (S) = {1}, and c(S)
. Hence, the data above gives rise to the game with characteristic function in the following table: The optimal solution set of Note that even though there are infinite optimal solutions of the problem (DLPB(N)), the Owen set of the (PIS) above reduces to a singleton again. We wonder if every (P IS) exhibits this property. Next section gives an affirmative answer.
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It is well-known that the larger the player set, the more difficult is to determine the core of a cost TU-game. The goal of this section is to find a core-allocation for a (PIG) which is easy to calculate and satisfies good properties.
The first result reveals that the Owen set of a (P IS) shrinks to a singleton and provides an explicit form to compute it. (N, D, H, B, P ) be a (PIS) with D being an integer matrix. Then, Owen(N, D, H, B, P ) = {(o 1 , . .., o n )} where, for each i ∈ N, 
Theorem 5.1 Let
Every cost allocation o = (o i ) i∈N of a (PIG) defined in this way is what we call the Owen point for (N, c) . Obviously, the Owen point is a core-allocation. The Owen point, for each player i, can be interpreted as the cost she has to pay when producing at the minimum operation cost. Hence, we propose the Owen point as an alternative value for (PIG). We note in passing that if the matrices P , H and B are integer then the core-allocation given by the Owen point is also in integer values.
The Owen point for the situation given in example 4.4 is obtained by
Next theorem shows that the Owen point can be reached through a pmas.
Theorem 5.2 Let (N, D, H, B, P ) be a (PIS) with D being an integer matrix, and (N, c) the corresponding (PIG). The Owen point can be reached through a pmas.
Proof. Define for all i ∈ S, S ⊆ N and S = ∅,
and for all S ⊆ R ⊆ N, S, R = ∅ and for all i ∈ S,
) and lemma 3.3 extended to coalition S ⊆ N ).
Finally, we see that y The Owen point for the game given in example 4.4 can be reached through the pmas
In that example the core is a singleton: the Owen point. This is not a general property for (PIG), although next theorem ensures the coincidence.
The following concept is required. The reader may notice that an essential player is the one for which there exists at least one period in which she is needed by the rest of players in order to produce at minimum cost a certain demand. On the other hand, an inessential player i is the one which is unnecessary by the grand coalition to operate at minimum cost.
We denote by E the set of essential players and by N \E its complementary set.
Next theorem shows that the core of a (PIG) shrinks to the Owen point just only when all player are inessential for the (PIS). , c(N \{i}) = o(N \{i}) . 
{c(R) − o(R)}, and for all
It can be easily checked that o * ∈ Core(N, c). Hence, we can conclude that Core(N, c) = {o}.
The proof above gets an insight into the structure of the core. If there exists at least an essential player, the rest of players compensate her for cooperation by reducing the cost when producing at minimum production cost according to (24) . On the contrary, if no player is essential the unique core-allocation is the one given by the cost generated when producing at minimum production cost.
The rest of the section is devoted to answer natural questions arising when a new class of totally balanced games and a new value for it is proposed.
(1) The first question is whether this class coincides with the entire class of totally balanced games. The answer is negative and can be clearly seen since not all flow games can be represented as one of our games.
(2) Second question. Is the Shapley value a core-allocation? Provided that the answer is affirmative, does the Shapley value coincide with the Owen point?
(3) Does the Owen point coincide with the nucleolus?
Example 5.5 is a counterexample for the first part of question (2) . Example 5.6 provides a game where the Owen point is different from the Shapley value, being the latter a core-allocation as well. The reader may notice that for the game in example 5.7 the Owen point allocates exactly the individual cost (c({i}) = o i for all i ∈ N ). We note in passing that each (PIG) with the property above is additive (hence concave) and the Owen point coincides with the Shapley value. Finally example 5.6 shows that the Owen point does not coincides with the nucleolus.
Example 5.5 Consider the (PIS) described in Table 1 . The reader can checked that for all S ⊆ N, H 1 (S) = {1, 2, 3} and c(S) =
demands production Inventory
Backlogging P1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 P2 0 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 P3 0 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a model of cooperation among several firms arising from dynamic production-inventory situations with discrete demand and finite planning horizon. In this model any group of firms agree in cooperation because there always exist fair allocations of operation cost which are stable in the sense that no firms have incentives to leave the group. From among all the above fair allocations, we propose the one in which every firm has to pay the minimum cost of operation. It is called the Owen point. This allocation is specially appeal since it can be calculated in polynomial time and, moreover, it can be extended as a collection of fair allocations for every group of firms, showing the consistency of the Owen point with regard to the fairness concept of any group of firms (pmas). In addition, the Owen point is the unique fair allocation just only when all firms are inessential (i.e. each one of them is unnecessary by the rest to operate at minimum cost). We note in passing that incorporating to the considered model selling prices would have not modify the structure of the problem and that all the conclusions would have been the same.
Additional topics for further research on the cooperation model considered in this paper are: (1) to find out descriptions of the structure of the core, (2) axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point, (3) alternative allocation schemes and (4) other forms of cooperation and /or competition.
Apart from the model studied in this paper it could also be considered among others the same model with concave functions or a different model of cooperation among several firms arising from dynamic ordering-inventory situations with discrete demand and finite planning horizon.
